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Abstract
In this writing we provide a brief overview on how in different fields such
as statistics, econometrics and experimental psychology, the issue of mea-
suring subjective expectations about future uncertain outcomes has been
attacked. In many situations realized observed data come from a decision
process in which the decision is made by considering future uncertain out-
comes, so that the observed data will depend on future outcome via the
probabilistic judgement made by the decision maker. For example the de-
cision to buy a car today will depend on our expectations about future in-
comes, so that observed data about the number of cars sold will depend
on peoples’ expectations about their future incomes. Expectations are not
observable so that we need proper statistical methods of inference to treat
these type of problems. Here, we provide a very general overview, and we
try to summarize different approaches.
Keywords
Subjective Expectations, Probability Elicitation, Rational Expectations, Prior
Specification.
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1 Introduction
One of the key assumption in economics theory is the so called “rational
expectation hypothesis”. In few words, rational expectation hypothesis as-
sumes that peoples’ expectations about future events are “consistent” and
“efficient”; where consistent means they do not make systematic errors, and
efficient means that they use all the available information. Moreover, this as-
sumption implicitly assumes that people are “utility maximizer”, this means
that people choose their actions maximizing their utility according with some
utility representation (e.g. expected utility, max-min expected utility etc.).
From a statistical point of view, this hypothesis is interesting since it rep-
resents the theoretical ground for the derivation of a huge number of econo-
metric models. Assuming rational expectations makes the life of Economists
easier but on the other hand this force them to make many unrealistic be-
havioural assumptions, and as a consequence the resulting inference leads
to unclear conclusions. Also, it is interesting how econometricians usually
avoid to relate the problem of expectations formation to that of prediction,
where from my point of view expectations follow prediction.
My plan is to investigate why we need to relax this assumption and how
it might be possible to do it without strong restrictions. One of the main
proposal in econometrics has been to use survey data on expectations, but
there is still a controversy about the consistency of these data with observed
behaviour. We think that in order to persuade economists of the importance
of eliciting expectations it is very important to test — possibly through exper-
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imental sessions — whether peoples’ behaviour is consistent with elicited
expectations.
Few papers appeared in international economic review use subjective
data on expectations elicited via survey questionnaires, but there has been
no effort in developing statistical tools to recover expectations. The other
issue, that seems very important to me, is to explore the statistical tools we
need to elicit people expectations and to understand their learning process
and their reaction to new information.
2 The rational expectation hypothesis as a prior specification hypoth-
esis
Econometric models predict choice behaviour from data on observed
choices, for many years this has been the standard practice. The theoretical
tool underlining this approach is the so called “principle of revealed prefer-
ences”. It was introduced by Samuelson (1938, 1948) who showed that
observed choices combined with the assumptions of classical consumer
theory implies restrictions on the consumption bundles that a person would
choose when she faces her budget constraints. This idea justified the use
of observed choice data to infer the underlying decision process. A more
practical form of the principle referred as “revealed stochastic preference
model” was developed later by McFadden (1974), who tried to answer to
the question whether distributions of choices observed from a random sam-
ple of individuals in a variety of choice situations, is consistent with rational
choice theory which postulates that individuals maximize preferences. Mc-
Fadden (1974) assumed that a researcher observes a random sample of
person with heterogenous preferences each one facing a decision problem,
then he showed that data combined with assumptions on population dis-
tribution of preferences enable to estimate probabilistic choice model and
predict choice behaviour1.
1McFadden (1974) takes into consideration only discrete choice problems with a finite
set of outcomes. A complete description of further generalizations to possibly infinite set of
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However this approach fails to be reasonable when the decision maker
does not know the outcome of her or his decision; in economic theory this
situation is referred as “partial information”. For the most part of interesting
economics problems, people face partial information, and in practice Econo-
mists assume that people have consistent subjective probability distributions
on unknown quantities and then they choose maximising their expected util-
ity given their preferences over the unknown outcomes. Again the problem
with this approach is that observed data can be consistent with a number
of different specification of preferences and subjective probability. In order
to get identification Economists assume that decision makers have specific
expectations objectively correct, i.e they hold rational expectations. Ratio-
nal expectations and revealed preferences are what an economist needs to
model observed choice data alone.
In order to better understand the consequences of this hypothesis we
will introduce some formalism and a simple well known economic models,
the so called “permanent income model”.
We can describe a general decision problem as follows. Suppose that
X is choice set, i.e. a set of possible actions or quantities that an economic
agent will choose. For instance X could be all the possible quantities of a
goods a person could buy. Ω is the set of all possible state of nature relevant
for the decision, ω∗ ∈ Ω is the true state of nature. In the example before Ω
is the set of all possible value of future income, and ω∗ is the true income a
decision maker will face. Each agent have an objective real valued function
that values her or his decision u : X × Ω −→ R. The problem of agent is
take an optimal decision x∗ such that
x∗ = argmax
x∈X
u(x, ω∗). (2.1)
If ω∗ is unknown then problem (2.1) can be solved if and only if there exists
a x∗ ∈ X such that for all (x, ω) ∈ X × Ω, u(x∗, ω) ≥ u(x, ω). Since this
is only a special case, Economists need to make some restrictions in terms
of behavioural assumptions. Instead of solving problem (2.1), it is assumed
outcomes and to continues choice problem can be found in McFadden (2004)
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that people solve
x∗ = argmax
x∈X
∫
u(x, ω)dP, (2.2)
where P denotes a subjective probability distribution over Ω. The justifica-
tion of (2.2) is Savage (1954) axiomatization of subjective expected utility.
Since P is subjective then Economist need to restrict the set of all proba-
bility distributions over Ω assuming rational expectations, i.e. they assume
that decision makers know the objective probability distribution that gener-
ates ω∗.
Moreover Economist assume much more than rational expectations. It
is also assumed that people use all the available information in order to form
rational expectations. If Σ is the set of all available information, it is usually
assumed that everyone can access to Σ and thus everyone hold correct
probability distribution over ω∗ conditional on Σ, in other words the problem
that everyone face is to find
x∗ = argmax
x∈X
EP [u(x, ω)|Σ], (2.3)
where EP is the expectation taken with the respect to P . Assuming ratio-
nal expectation along with the hypothesis of stochastic revealed preferences
ensure that choice observed data are sufficient to identify a choice model
based on maximising expected utility behaviour.
It is obvious that the hypothesis above is just an assumption which states
that a rational agent holds a prior beliefs of the unknown P which is consis-
tent with realized data. That is the same as saying that realized past data
provide the economic decision maker with an empirical evidence sufficient
to specify a coherent empirical prior on the unknown. This is the reason why
we can look at the rational expectation hypothesis as a way of imposing an
objective empirical2 prior on the unknown. Though this is a subtle aspect, it
is important to notice that this much more that imposing a prior distribution
for an unknown quantities. In fact, a prior is never required to be the true
2Here by empirical we mean that this prior is derived on the basis of past data.
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distribution which moves observables, but in this case it is imposed that P is
the true distribution of the unknown so that our rational decision maker will
not do any systematic error in predicting future uncertain outcomes.
3 From the theory to the inference: the example of the consumption
model
3.1 Theory
Now we want to illustrate how all these concepts are usually embodied
in the economics literature, from theory to econometric practices. We are
going to present one of the main tool used by economists to analyse and
predict future aggregated consumption levels. In the following exposition we
will skip many mathematical details because our main object is not to un-
derstand techniques; for further details see Lucas and Stockey (1989). In
this section we do not discuss the economic contents and the coherence of
all those assumptions we are going to make. Many of the following assump-
tions have no interesting economics content, but we need them in order to
achieve mathematical tractability. In the next section, instead, we shall focus
on those restrictive assumptions that we need in order to make inference on
the model, and we will see how these assumptions are restrictive.
First of all we fix some notation. There is a representative economic
agent (a consumer) who live from time t = 0, 1, . . . , T , and in each period
he or she faces a budget constraint and has to choose a level of consump-
tion ct. The time horizon our consumer will face it is assumed to be infinite
since she or he incorporates in her or his utility the choice of all the next
generations. So that we let T → +∞. In each period t the consumer has
a level of wealth At, and perceive an income yt. She or he can save and
invest money at rate rt, for simplicity we assume that the rate of interest is
known for each t and it is constant3. We also suppose that A0 ≥ 0 and
AT+1 ≥ 0. The last two assumptions imply that the consumer is not al-
lowed to have debts at the beginning and at the end of his or her life. The
3We could drop this simplifying assumption making the mathematics harder.
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consumer can invest his or her wealth at rate r, then in each period t she or
he faces the following budget constraint: At+1 ≤ (1+r)(At+yt−ct). Fur-
thermore we assume that there exists a law of motion (or transition equation)
for the income yt, that is, there exists a continuous function f : R −→ R,
which relates future income to present income through a sequence of i.i.d.
random variables {²t}∞t=0 and past values of income and wealth. We ex-
press future income as yt+1 = f(yt, At, ²t), with y0 and ²0 given. The
sequence {²t}∞t=0 is described by a probability distribution function Q, that
is Q(²|y, a) = Prob[et ≤ ²|yt = y,At = A]. We need also to suppose
that f is measurable with the respect of Q and it satisfies the Feller prop-
erty4. It is important to notice that all the variables involved in this model,
except for ², are observable at the beginning of each period t, so ²t is not
observable at time t. According with the foundations of economic theory,
each consumer is utility-maximizer, i.e. her or his preferences are described
by a continuous real valued utility function u(ct), and the consumer wants
to maximize her or his utility given the budget constraint. For simplicity we
assume that u(·) is time invariant. Also, we assume that u(·) is strictly
concave (meaning strictly decreasing marginal utility), bounded, continuous
with continuous first derivatives. In synthesis the problem of each agent for
each t = 0, 1, . . . , T is
max
{ct}Tt=0
EQ
[
T∑
t=0
1
(1 + ρ)t
u(ct)
∣∣∣∣Ωt
]
, (C)
s.t. At+1 ≤ (1 + r)(At + yt − ct), (3.1)
A0, y0, ²0 given, (3.2)
yt+1 = f(yt, At, ²t); (3.3)
where (1 + ρ) is a subjective discount factor for future utility assumed to be
constant over time with ρ ∈ (0, 1), and Ωt is the information set at time t,
4This means that for every bounded and continuous real valued function ψ,
E [ψ(yt+1)|yt = y,At = A] is bounded and continuous in all its arguments. We need this
property in order to guarantee the solution of the functional equation (SC) that we are going
to see.
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it contains all the past and current values about consumption, income and
wealth and past values of shocks ². Notice that it is assumed that ρ and Ωt
are set to be equal across individuals for each t. At the end of this economy
there is no market to invest in, so it is optimal that AT+1 = 0, this imply that,
going backward up to time 0, the constraint (3.1) can be taken with equality.
The problem above is to find a sequence {c∗t }+∞t=0 such that the program (C)
is solved; under these assumptions we could easily prove that such solution
exists and it is unique. In order to solve this problem we need some more
mathematical tool.
Under our assumptions it is possible to show (see Lucas and Stockey,
1989) that our stationary time invariant dynamic programming problem (C)
can be equivalently translated into a biperiodal sequential problem using the
following Belman equation
V (At) = max
{At+1}Tt=0
{
u(ct(At+1)) +
1
1 + ρ
EQ
[
V (At+1)
∣∣∣∣Ωt]} , (SC)
s.t. At+1 = (1 + r)(At + yt − ct), (3.4)
A0, y0, ²0 given, (3.5)
yt+1 = f(yt, At, ²t); (3.6)
where V (·) is the value function associated with the program (C). We fixed
At+1 as control, At as the state, and we got rid of ct which we can now
express as linear function of At+1. We start programming in time 0, A0 is
given and once the optimal level of A1 has been chosen, then using equa-
tion (3.4) we have c∗1, so for a general period t. Since the Belmann equation
is a contraction, a solution exists and can be calculated using analytic tech-
niques or numerical methods. Note that this is a strictly concave dynamic
programming problem, and it can be shown that it has inner solutions. Also
the first order condition of the functional equation (SC) are necessary and
sufficient for a maximum. Taking the first order conditions for (SC) we have
∂u(ct(At+1))
∂ct
dct(At+1)
dAt+1
+
1
1 + ρ
EQ
[
∂V (At+1)
∂At+1
∣∣∣∣Ωt] = 0. (3.7)
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Let f ′(x) = df(x)/dx, the previous becomes
u′(ct)
(
− 1
1 + r
)
+
1
1 + ρ
EQ
[
V ′(At+1)|Ωt
]
= 0; (3.8)
where
ct = At + yt − At+11 + r .
Note that we will write ct instead of expression above in order to simplify
the notation. By envelope theorem5 V ′(A∗t ) = u′(c∗t ), where the symbol “∗”
means optimal solution to (SC) and as a consequence a solution to equation
(3.8). Also by stationarity V ′(A∗t+1) = u′(c∗t+1), and thus we can rewrite
(3.7) as
u′(c∗t )
EQ
[
u′(c∗t+1)|Ωt
] = 1 + r
1 + ρ
. (3.9)
The last equation is the so called “Euler equation”, it relates optimal current
marginal utility with next period expected marginal utility, interest rate and
the intertemporal subjective discount rate. Note that at time t, all the infor-
mation about the past and the present income, wealth, consumption and
realized value of innovations ², is in the set Ωt6, so that EQ [u′(ct)|Ωt] =
u′(ct). Given an utility function, equation (3.9) becomes a second order dif-
ference equation which, together with conditions (3.2) and (3.3), give us a
solution which will represent the law of motion of optimal consumption. The
economic contents of equation (3.9) is appealing, but is far from our scope.
3.2 Inference
In this section we shall see how the rational expectations hypothesis is
important in order to make inference on the model described above without
using subjective data.
In this simplified model an economist relates optimal consumption de-
cisions to income and wealth. The only source of uncertainty is the i.i.d.
5See any intermediate or advanced book in mathematical programming.
6In this modelling, these innovations are identifiable since in each time a consumer has
all the equations he or she needs to compute the past error terms.
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sequence of innovations which affect the future income. The dynamic of
income affects the budget constraint equation (3.4), and as a consequence,
the optimal decision about how much to consume in each period. Note that
the dynamic of wealth is not important; in fact given A0, once we know
how the income determines the optimal consumption level we get A1, then
the same apply for A2 and so on, and the whole path of wealth accumu-
lation is recovered. So what really matters for our consumer is the income
dynamic. However an econometrician has data about past consumption
choices, wealth and income, but he knows anything about the sequence of
{²t}Tt=0. How shall he or she procede in studying the relationship between
consumption choices and income dynamics? Let us see how an econome-
trician who believes in the rational expectations hypothesis would tackle the
problem.
First of all we need some functional form for the utility function. Given
choice data on consumption, the revealed stochastic preference theory will
allow an econometrician to restrict the family of admissible utility functions.
Without enter the theoretical details, we can use some parametric family of
utility functions, so that shape will depend on some vector of parameters.
Also, we want some utility function which will provide us with a linear mar-
ginal utility. We take a quadratic utility function u(ct) = act − (b/2)c2t with
marginal utility u′(ct) = a−bct. By the linearity of expectation operator, this
family of utility functions allows us to write EQ [u′(ct)|Ωt] = u′(EQ[ct|Ωt]).
Applying the Euler equation (3.9) we have
EQ
[
c∗t+1|Ωt
]
=
a
b
r − ρ
1 + r
+
1 + ρ
1 + r
c∗t ; (3.10)
this equation describes the law of motion of optimal consumption. Up to this
point we still do not have the income and shocks in our equations, and also
on the left hand side of (3.10) we have a conditional moment.
At this point an economist would introduce the rational expectation hy-
pothesis: a “rational economic agent”7 uses all the available information, he
7Here the wording comes from the standard economic literature, but this does not imply
that we accept this simple idea of rationality.
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perfectly knows the probabilistic structure of the data generating process
and he does not make any systematic forecast error. Translating these
words in our example this means that: (i) Ωt is equal for each consumer and
contains everything which is useful to predict yt+1; (ii) our economic agent
knows the probabilistic structure of the sequence of innovations {²t}Tt=0, i.e.
he knows Q and hence the data generating process of future income; (iii)
there is no systematic error in predictions. This last statement is formalized
introducing an error term ηt+1 = c∗t+1−EQ
[
c∗t+1|Ωt
]
with the property that
E [ηt+1|Ωt] = 08.
Notice that all the randomness of the model comes from the sequence
of innovations ²t through the probability distribution function Q, so the error
term η depends on ². Let us introduce a real valued function g which is
measurable with respect to Q, in the econometric literature is supposed that
ηt+1 = g(²t+1) = c∗t+1−EQ
[
c∗t+1|Ωt
]
, t = 0, 1, . . . , T . The term ηt is the
forecast error at time t, and it is a function of the random term of the model.
By the previous conclusion, the rational expectation hypothesis implies that
EQ [g(²t+1)|Ωt] = 0 for every t = 0, 1, . . . , T .
Introducing this hypothesis allows our econometrician to transform (3.10)
into
c∗t+1 =
a
b
r − ρ
1 + r
+
1 + ρ
1 + r
c∗t + ηt+1. (3.11)
We want to simplify our algebra as much as we can, thus without loss of
generality we assume that r = ρ, and hence (3.11) becomes a random
walk
c∗t+1 = c
∗
t + ηt+1. (3.12)
To link optimal consumption to incomes we now need the budget con-
straint (3.4). We want to base our analysis to a generic period t, however
we wrote the budget constraint equation based on t = 0. Let us rewrite it as
At+s+1 = (1+ r)(At+s+yt+s− c∗t+s) with s = 0, 1, . . . , T . Also, we want
get rid of At+s+1. From the budget constraint equation, taking expectations
8This is not a property that depends on some reason related to the underlaying probability
distribution, this equality is indeed assumed to be valid if rational expextations hold.
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and substituting recursively At+s+1 into At+s+2 and so on, we have
T−t∑
s=0
EQ
[
c∗t+s|Ωt
]
(1 + r)s
= At +
T−t∑
s=0
EQ [yt+s|Ωt]
(1 + r)s
. (3.13)
Now we substitute (3.12) into the previous and we obtain
c∗t
T−t∑
s=0
1
(1 + r)s
= At +
T−t∑
s=0
EQ [yt+s|Ωt]
(1 + r)s
. (3.14)
Since an interest rate is contained in the interval (0, 1)
T−t∑
s=0
1
(1 + r)s
=
1 + r
r
[
1− 1
(1 + r)T−t+1
]
, (3.15)
it follows that (3.14) becomes
c∗t =
r
1 + r
[
1− 1
(1 + r)T−t+1
]−1 [
At +
T−t∑
s=0
EQ [yt+s|Ωt]
(1 + r)s
]
. (3.16)
Since we assumed that T −→ +∞, (3.16) can be written as
c∗t =
r
1 + r
[
At +
+∞∑
s=0
EQ [yt+s|Ωt]
(1 + r)s
]
. (3.17)
The last equation says that the actual optimal consumption depends on the
actual wealth plus the sum of all the future expected incomes. Setting
ypt =
[
At +
+∞∑
s=0
EQ [yt+s|Ωt]
(1 + r)s
]
. (3.18)
we have what in economics is called “permanent income” (for details see
Friedman, 1957; Hall, 1978). According with this model a consumer bases
his or her decisions about consumption on expected level of future incomes
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and the actual wealth.
To test this model, or to use this model to predict aggregated consump-
tion levels there is still a problem: the econometrician does not dispose of
data about expected incomes. The inferential problem of the econometri-
cian will face is the same of the one faced by the consumer, he has to infer
the data generating process of incomes. Again, by the rational expectation
hypothesis, the solution is that the econometrician has in mind the same
data generating process that a representative “rational” agent will have, i.e.
econometrician and agents both have the same empirical and objective prior
about the stochastic structure that generates incomes. He or she will substi-
tute this model of future income in (3.17) computing all the conditional mo-
ments. For example an econometrician could suppose that yt ∼ AR(1) with
innovations ²t. With yt+s = φyt+s−1+ ²t+s we have EQ (yt+s|Ωt) = φsyt,
thus (3.17) becomes
c∗t =
r
1 + r
At +
r
1 + r − φyt. (3.19)
Having data on consumption level chosen and actual income, now the econo-
metrician can estimate and make inference on the model. For instance a
model very similar to the one we presented can be find in Campbell and
Deaton (1989). The authors estimated the model of the labour income
dynamics for the United Stated and they found that it followed an AR(2)
process
yt = µ+ (1 + ψ)yt−1 − ψyt−2 + ²t,
with ψ > 0. But this led to a famous inconsistency known as the “excess
smoothness paradox”. Using the AR(2) process with ψ > 0 they showed
that the the theoretical model for the consumption predicts that the variability
of∆c∗t = c∗t+1−c∗t is greater than the variability of∆yt = yt+1−yt, however
the empirical evidence suggests the opposite.
3.3 Critiques
In the previous section we have illustrated a basic model of consumer
behaviour. This model with its simplicity is not far from what economist
usually do in practice. We could drop some simplifications (e.g. we could
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suppose that the interest rate is not constant over time and that it is different
from the subjective discount factor, also we could introduce some more so-
phisticated utility function, and so on), however these simplifications would
not change the main result of the analysis above, the only thing it will change
is in a complication of the mathematics. Hence the critiques we shall argue
thereafter are not narrowed by these simplifications. It is important to make
clear that the kind of arguments we are going to make are general and they
do not depend on the peculiar simplifications made in order to simplify the
algebra.
We can see the “rationality” assumption as composed by three compo-
nents: preference-maximizing behaviour, efficient use of information, and
perfect ability in recovering data generating processes. We are going to dis-
cuss each of them separately.
Preference-maximizing behaviour. The first thing we want to point
out is that the general idea of preference-maximizing behaviour, even if it
is compelling on the theoretical ground, it is hard to apply in the empirical
practice. The decision depend on the subjective utility function together with
the subjective idea of the process that generates the data, but we can never
identify these two contributes separately. In other words, the decision about
the sequence {c∗t }Tt=0 comes from a maximization program based on a util-
ity function u and the probability distribution Q about future income levels,
now the problem is that the consumption profile we observe form the data
could be compatible with different combinations of u and Q. The big issue
with this kind of modelling is the lack of observability of hypothetical9 out-
comes, without these, it is truly hard to think about the contemporaneous
identification of both u and Q based on past data on c and y.
This argument is more general than the one we want discuss on in this
work. It is related with old debate about economics modelling and the re-
lated “structural estimation”. The idea of the supporter of this view is that we
9Notice that econometricians use to refer to “counterfactuals” in many distinct situations,
rather than distinguishing between hypothetical knowledge and counterfactual reasoning.
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cannot estimate a model based on data without having a “rational theory”10
about the structure of the economics. Even if we agree that in order to esti-
mate an equation we need some theoretical background which justify it, the
position of this “structuralist party” is hard to understand when one tries to
introduce some view of rationality. Rationality is a strong and hard concept,
and we believe that economists sometimes abuse of it.
Efficient use of information. The other critiques we want to make is
about the concept of efficiency. Economists usually assume that people use
information efficiently meaning that they condition on all those variables that
are needed to predict the desired one. In our example this means that Ωt
contains all those information we need in order to condition our expectation
about y and therefor predict optimally next periods’ income. This hypothesis
is a bit vague, what the structure of Ωt is? Not only, but also the notion
of rationality that economists usually introduce implies that Ωt is equal for
all individuals. In their view if one is rational then he or she knows what the
relevant variables needed to predict future income levels. In the previous ex-
ample we solved the problem assuming that yt followed an AR(1) process,
so this means that in each period a consumer conditioned on past income
realization in order to predict next period income.
Following this argument, every econometrician who would test the model
above, he should construct the model conditioning on the same information
set as an economic agent will do. In fact, an econometrician who has to
make empirical analysis starting from data, faces the same inferential prob-
lems as the decision maker: he has to make induction from a finite sample.
Now if this was the case, every econometrician testing the same model
should estimate the same equation using the same variables, but if look at
the empirical literature about consumer theory this clearly not the case.
Perfect ability in recovering data generating processes. The as-
sumption that agents are able to infer the true data generating process is
too demanding. In the example of consumer theory we saw that an econo-
metrician who bases her or his analysis on choice data alone needs to as-
10Again, we would stress that the wording comes from the standard economic literature.
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sume that people, by rational expectations hypothesis, have in mind the true
probability distribution Q of future income levels. Remaining in the exam-
ple of consumer theory, empirical economists always disagree on the “true
generating process” of income, so that it appears hopelessly optimistic to
suppose that expectations are rational, even approximately.
The main problem is that the resulting inference is indeterminate. For in-
stance in Campbell and Deaton (1989) they found that the model presented11
leads to some anomalous result (e.g. the excess smoothness paradox),
now what would the conclusion be? Is the preference-maximizing behaviour
wrong? Is the the supposed data generating process for income mislead-
ing? Is the peculiar family of utility functions not representative of consumer
behaviour? The answers is that we cannot make conclusions, since the
number of restricting assumptions we are making is huge, and the effect of
this assumptions can be strong.
Even though each of these three components leads to strong restric-
tions on the economic behaviour, the first one is not intimately connected
with the rational expectation hypothesis as the followings. In particular, in
our view, the idea that people maximize their expected utility is not realistic,
and in fact there exists an huge experimental literature which shows that
the expected utility representation of preferences over uncertain outcomes
is usually violated. But we do not want to tackle this issue here. The first
component, as long as poses strong and controversial restrictions, is much
more related to the general decision theory and marginally affects the sta-
tistical practice. In this work we shall try to answer to the question whether
is possible to drop the rational expectations assumption in order to get less
restricted econometric models, and so our research shall focus on those
statistical instruments convenient to drop those assumptions related to the
second and the third component. As we will see, we think that these is-
sues ar strongly related to peoples’ predictive abilities and we will try to find
answers to our question starting to think about the predictive tasks one is
required to complete when she or he has to think about expectations.
11They tested a model with a slightly different setup.
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4 Subjective expectations: what has been done
4.1 The need of subjective expectations data
On the theoretical ground economics modelling is always about choices
under uncertainty, so that the empirical testing will always deal with estimat-
ing equations in which some expectation will appear. We took the example
of the consumption model, as our leading example for our analysis, however
we want to stress that this problematic is more general.
Choice data are insufficient to estimate models involving expected vari-
ables, the only way to fully identify these models is to introduce strong and
unrealistic assumptions as we have seen so far, what we want to conclude
is that we should try to make any effort in order to combine choice data with
data on expectations. For instance, if in the consumption model we could
dispose of data about consumers’ expectations on future income levels, a
structural model about income dynamics and the hypothesis that people
have in mind the same model of the economy we have, it would be un-
needed; and also we did not need to make the assumption that peoples use
information efficiently. All this “restriction saving” would improve the coher-
ence of our modelling, making our inference less indeterminate.
These needs has emerged during the past few years, and few papers
on the topic appeared in international economic reviews, this means that the
idea of using subjective data, i.e. self-reported data about expectations of
future events, still rises doubts amongst economists. They have been skep-
tical about subjective statements, and usually, they justify their skepticism
arguing that “one should believe what people do, not what they say”. This is
a standard objection which an economist would make. The fact that people
could be not able to fully report probability statements is widely investigated
in experimental psychology and other related disciplines, however from what
we will see later on this is not the case. A good overview history of the de-
bate about the use of subjective data can be found in Dominitz and Manski
(1997), and Manski (2004).
However, we think that not many efforts have been done in economet-
22
rics in developing the tools needed to elicit expectations, and moreover the
actual econometric literature does not pose the issue of expectations in the
wider contest of the theory of prediction. We think that the two thinks are
intimately related.
With this work we have a plan: we want to assess whether the self-
reported probability statements about future scenarios are consistent with
observed choices and in this case “what people have in mind should really
matter”, we want to find optimal tools in order to elicit expectations, also we
want to develop a set of statistical tools to predict future behaviour based on
both choice data and data about expectations, understanding how people
react to new information acquisition.
4.2 Elicitation of subjective expectations
Suppose we want to estimate an equation in which we have, amongst
the regressors, next period expected prices’ growth, i.e. expected inflation
rate about next period. Without making unrealistic assumptions, we need
data on expectations. If pit is the inflation rate that we observe at time t, Ωt
is the information set at time t containing past and current data about infla-
tion, our problem is to collect data on E [pit+1|Ωt] = piet . We could collect
these data about piet in two different ways: (i) at time t we can ask to people
to attach probabilities about pit+1 and try to recover the probability distribu-
tion of pit+1|Ωt people have in mind, and then we can take the expectation
of this piet ; (ii) more simply, if i = 1, 2, . . . , n are subjects interviewed, we
could ask to people what is their piei,t, where piei,t is the expectation reported
by individual i at time t about inflation in time t + 1. Each one of the two
approaches has advantages and limitations, in this section we will examine
what is the state of the art of the literature about expectations’ elicitation.
It is important to notice that the problem we are analyzing touches a number
of grounds. It is strongly related with the psychology involved in the elicita-
tion process, from the statistical point of view it involves a number of issues:
the theory of prediction, how to treat this kind of data, how to evaluate the
accuracy the expectations recovered, how to predict peoples’ reaction to
new information, etc.
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4.3 Psychological issues: four heuristics
An elicitation methods is the statistical translation of people believes
about future events, so that we cannot set up a proper method apart from
the psychological research about men’s abilities to make probabilistic judge-
ments12.
Psychological research has been concerned with the problem of how a
person quantify the probability of an event, or how he or her judges which
event is the more likely to occur. We want to stress that whenever we use the
word “probability”, we have to be very careful. Probability is a sort of primi-
tive concept in our culture but the content of this concept could be different
among individuals, so that when someone ask to us “what is, in your opin-
ion the probability that X occurs?” It’s very hard to attach a sort of standard
meaning to that answer. One of the direction of psychological research has
been devoted to address the question whether people attach to the word
probability some common significance.
From experimental psychology literature, it appears that intuitive judge-
ments about probability are based on a limited number of mental operations.
The wording used by psychologists to describe this operations is “heuris-
tics”. These heuristics are quite effective, but they also lead to errors and
systematic bias. We will briefly review some of the most important findings
about these .
Heuristic 1: judgement by representativeness.
Suppose we ask what is the probability that an object X belongs to a
category Y ? Or, what is the probability that Y follows X? The answer re-
quires to evaluate Prob (X|Y ) to be assessed, people typically compare the
main features of X and Y and assign a probability depending on the degree
of similarity between them. A common error made with this kind of judge-
ment is that little or no attention is paid to the unconditional probability of
12The most part of this section is inspired to the presentation “Judgement and Forecasting”
held by Prof. Nigel Harvey in the seminar series on prediction organized by the Department
of Statistical Sciences at University College London (UK)
24
Y . A complete description of this is given in Kahneman and Tversky (1973).
Similar results have been obtained by Hammerton (1975) and Nisbett et al.
(1976).
Heuristic 2: judgement by anchoring and adjustment.
A person estimates an unknown quantity by starting from some initial
value and then adjusting it up to obtain a final estimate. The starting value
is usually called “the anchor”. One finding by Slovic (1972) is that is that
regardless of the source of the starting value, the adjustment is usually too
small, this phenomenon is called anchoring. Kahneman and Tversky (1973)
run an experiment in which individuals were asked to estimate various quan-
tities, stated in percentages, they were given randomly chosen starting val-
ues and first they were asked whether the value they had been given was
too high or too low, and then to adjust it until they reached their best esti-
mate. Subjects whose starting values were high ended up with substantially
higher estimates than those who started with low values. In this case the
Bayes theorem is violated. When subjects use the heuristic judgement-by-
representativeness to quantify probabilities, they tend to ignore their priors.
Also other experiments have shown that if subjects are made aware of a
prior probabilities and are asked to modify these as new data are available,
then the assessed posterior probabilities are too close to the prior probabil-
ities, compared with the revision indicated by Bayes theorem. This effect is
referred as conservatism (see Edwards and Phillips, 1964). Several experi-
ments have been made to verify the violation of the Bayes theorem changing
the structure of the experiment, but it seems that conservatism is a recurrent
effect.
Tversky and Kahneman (1971) demonstrated that, in many circumstances,
people expect a sample from a population to represent all the essential char-
acteristics of that population, even if the sample is small. They refer to this
phenomena as the “law of small numbers”, since it seems that people be-
lieve that the law of large numbers applies to small numbers as well. The
error is readily attributable to belief in the law of small numbers; people ex-
pect all samples to have virtually identical characteristics so that they do not
updated their estimated probability.
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Heuristic 3: judgement by availability.
A person estimates the frequency or the probability of an event by the
ease with which examples come to his or her mind. A classic example:
suppose you are asked whether a randomly chosen word from an English
text is more likely to start with an “r”, or have an “r” as its third letter. In
this case it is easier to recall words by their starting letter (e.g. r-ubber,
r-ank, r-ed, etc.) than by their third letter (e.g. pa-r-ty, wi-r-e, etc.). In
a number of experiment, most people judge that “r” is more likely to be
the first letter of a word rather than the third one. If we take an English
dictionary and we calculate the frequencies of “r” being the first and the
third letter of word we discover that it is more likely to have an “r” as a third
letter as found in Kahneman and Tversky (1973). Furthermore familiarity
and newsworthy events also impact disproportionately on our memory, so
we might overestimate the probability of a plane crash with fatalities, for
example, particularly if such a crash has happened recently (see Kahneman
and Tversky, 1973).
Heuristic 4: hindsight bias.
Knowledge of what has occurred tends to distort memory and peo-
ple tend to exaggerate their a priori probability for an event that has oc-
curred. Fischhoff and Beyth (1975) conducted an experiment during Pres-
ident Nixon’s visit to China and the USSR in 1972, subjects were asked to
assess the probabilities of various possible outcomes of his visit, such as
“President Nixon will meet Mao at least once?” “The USA and the USSR
will agree to a joint space program?”. After the visit the subjects were asked
to recall the probabilities they had given before Nixon’s visit, than they were
asked which events they thought had actually occurred. The result of the
experiment was that: (i) subjects generally overestimated their a priori prob-
abilities for the events they thought had occurred (ii) they underestimated
the priori probabilities for the events they thought had not occurred.
Here we have described only some of the heuristics well known in the
psychologic literature, at least we cited those related with the main issues
we aim to analyze in this work. An extensive review of the findings can be
found in Hogarth (1987).
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4.4 The psychology of summaries elicitations
In this section we want to give a brief overview of the main findings about
peoples’ ability to elicit summary statistics. In general elicitation of summary
statistics from multivariate distribution is more complicated if compared with
the univariate case. In our work we will not need to elicit expectations about
multiple variables so that this brief review is confined to the univariate case.
For a complete review about this topic see Garthwaite et al. (2004).
The literature on this topic is vaste and it comes from the 60’s to 80’s.
Here we are interested to evaluate abilities to summarize statistical quan-
tities like mean, median, variance, quartiles, etc. In general it results that
people are quite good in interpreting data giving good approximations of the
statistical summaries.
Several studies have examined the ability to recover sample proportions.
For instance Shuford (1961) proposed a 20× 20 matrix to a number of indi-
viduals one at time. Each element of the matrix was a blue square or a red
square. A subgroup of individuals was shown the matrix for one second, to
another subgroup the matrix was shown for ten seconds. After the matrix
was shown, an individual was asked the proportion of blue and red squares.
The result of the experiment was that the mean of subjects’ estimate differed
from the sample proportion by .05 People seem to be fairly able to estimate
proportions.
Similar experiments have been conducted to analyze individuals’ abili-
ties to estimate measure of central tendency. Typically they are quit good in
identifying the mean and median. However, in an experiment by Peterson
and Miller (1964) it resulted that as well as a the distribution of sample is
highly skewed, while the estimated mode and median resulted to be rea-
sonably accurate, the estimated mean was biased.
While people seem to be able to estimate the central tendency of the
sample they are exposed to, it results that the estimation of the variability
is critical. In a number of experiments people appeared to be in troubles
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when exposed to the concept of variability. Experiments conducted to test
the ability to estimate the variance of a sample have not given good re-
sults. Experimental psychologists showed that people are more confident
with statements about credible intervals. In many experiments an an indi-
vidual is shown a sample X divided into a partition of subsets X1, . . . , Xn,
then he or she is asked what is the probability of an element of X falling
in some subset Xi. It seems that peoples have fairly good ability to elicit
credible intervals, this technique together with some distributional assump-
tion have been employed to construct estimates of the variance perceived
by people. Using this procedure it seems that also the task of measuring
variability in a sample is done with reasonable errors, but the direct estimate
of variance is highly biased.
An important research aimed to assess the ability to convert phrases —
for example “quite probable”, “very likely” — into numeric values, and valuing
wether verbal expressions of probability have to be preferred to numerical
expressions or vice-versa. Wallsten et al. (1986) showed that people are
more comfortable to express their uncertainty in verbal expressions rather
than providing numerical measures. Unfortunately is not easy to convert
verbal expression in numbers as long as different subjects attach to verbal
expression different meanings.
5 Fitting distributions with elicited probabilities
As we pointed out before the problem of eliciting distributions of un-
known quantities is not new. In bayesian analysis the problem of prior se-
lection led to an huge research on methods for prior elicitation based on
experts’ questionnaires. There are researcher who believe that rather than
developing mechanical mathematical methods to specify a prior for a given
unknown quantities of interest, the choice of the prior should be based on
the real prior knowledge of experts. In this view a number of methods have
been proposed in order to elicit this knowledge.
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There are to ways of eliciting a probability distribution for a given un-
known quantity: (i) we can suppose that the unknown distribution belongs
to some family, and then we can elicit the prior knowledge on this quantity
trying to elicit believes on the parameter that fully identify the unknown distri-
bution; in this case we are doing a parametric fitting; (ii) we can suppose that
the unknown distribution belongs to some wide class of distribution functions
and then we find methods to identify the one that is the more coherent with
experts prior knowledge; in this case we talk about non-parametric elicita-
tion methods.
Notice that in this section we will talk about findings emerged form the
statistical literature. There has been not so much work in this area in econo-
metrics, and the few methods of fitting we know have no bayesian setting,
for this reason we believe that it will be better to describe the findings in the
two literatures separately.
5.1 Parametric fitting
Suppose we are interested in an unknown quantity X , suppose we are
interested to recover the probability distribution over X that a number of
peoples have in mind. We can interview these respondents trying to extract
information useful to recover such a probability distribution, given that we
are imposing that one exists. We can impose that prior knowledge of inter-
viewed about X can be described by a distribution fX(x; θ) belonging to
some family Fθ which members are distinguished by the hyperparameters
θ, and then the elicitation task it is reduced to choosing appropriate values
for θ in order to capture the main features of respondents’ opinion.
Notice that in this framework we have that the researcher expresses her
or his own prior knowledge on the unknown quantity of interest. This is the
same as saying that this approach involves a two stages elicitation process:
in the first stage the researcher believes that the probability distribution of
X belongs to some family Fθ, so he or she chooses fX(x; θ) to describe
X , in the second stage the researcher sets up a method to elicit θ based on
prior knowledge of a number of people participating to a questionnaire. The
subjective knowledge of the researcher is fundamental. Very often, rather
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than following some logical argument, he family Fθ is typically chosen con-
sidering the mathematical tractability of the problem. Although, advances
in bayesian computation through MCMC methods make it viable to specify
more complex families.
In this framework two elicitation tasks have been explored in the statistical
literature: elicitation of priors for Bernoulli process and coefficients of linear
regression models.
Suppose we are interested in eliciting a prior distribution on the parame-
ter θ (proportion or probability) of a Bernoulli process. We will explore some
elicitation scheme proposed.
One method is the so called “probability density function” method by
Winkler (1967). The researcher asks to state the most likely value of θ, and
to assesses other points of the p.d.f. for θ. Then a respondent is asked to
give other two points half as likely as previous one, and then he or she is
asked to specify quantiles for θ defined as points that divide the area under
the graph of the p.d.f. in specified proportions. Then the distribution of θ is
estimated. Notice that this method assumes that respondents know what is
a quantile and a p.d.f and it can be only considered in these cases. A related
method is the “quantile method” explored by Winkler (1972). In this method
is simply asked to specify median estimate of θ and to give one or more
quantiles for it. It is usually assumed that the respondents’ opinion can be
represented by a beta distribution (conjugate distribution for Bernoulli sam-
pling scheme), and then a beta distribution is specified matching parameters
with elicited quantiles. In this method researcher’s prior knowledge is that
peoples’ believes are partially homogenous. For partially homogenous we
mean that, although the researcher lets peoples to vary their prior opinion
about the parameter of the beta distribution which is supposed to represent
uncertainty about θ, on the other hand the researcher is fixing the family of
possible distribution for θ to be a unique distribution, the beta distribution.
On a different philosophy the “hypothetical future sample” tries to re-
cover the distribution of θ letting the sample to vary. Following Winkler
(1967), suppose that θ is the proportion of students at the University of
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Chicago who are male, the researcher asks questions of the form: “Sup-
pose a random sample of N students in the Chicago University campus
were taken and n¯ of them were male, what do you think is the probability that
one additional student, chosen at random, is male?”. For each respondent a
number of different hypothetical sample are proposed varying n¯ each time.
Each hypothetical sample yields an estimate of the hyperparameters and
some form of averaging is used to summarize them. Again the researcher
assumes that respondents underlying distribution for θ is a beta distribution,
so that respondents opinions are used to estimate the parameters of the
prior beta distribution. This method has the advantage to check for consis-
tency in the answers because a number of questions are asked to the same
subject. A similar method is the “equivalent prior sample” method by Win-
kler (1967), in which the respondent is asked to describe the sample rather
than the parameters of interests. The example in Winkler (1967) will clar-
ify the procedure, the researcher asks: “Can you determine two numbers
n¯ and N such that your knowledge would be roughly equivalent to having
observed exactly n¯ males in a random sample of N University of Chicago
students?” The researcher, as before, asks different questions letting n¯ and
N vary, and then assuming the prior distribution is a beta distribution the
parameters of the prior are estimated with some averaging method.
The general critique to these methods is that they leads to insufficient re-
vision of opinions, and they produce prior distributions that exhibit too small
variances. The reasons why these methods produce unrealistically tight
priors has been extensively explored, and one explanation is the bias pro-
duced by conservatism. Winkler (1967) found that the quantile method tends
to yield distributions that are slightly less tight than the probability density
method and much less tight than the hypothetical future sample and equiva-
lent prior sample methods. Compared on an experimental basis, evaluating
elicitation with scoring rules, seems that the quantile method is preferable
(for an extensive review of these results see Holstein (1971) and Schaefer
and k. Borcherding (1973)).
The other context of elicitation of prior is the classic multiple linear re-
gression model with normal errors. Suppose the model of interest is yi =
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x′iβ + ²i where yi is the response, xi ∈ Rk is a vector of observable,
and β ∈ Rk is the unknown vector of coefficients to be estimated, and
²i ∼ Normal(0, σ2) where σ2 is unknown. Our problem is to make infer-
ence on β so a prior for it has to be elicited. Usually a conjugate prior
distribution species that σ2 = αγ(1/c) where c ∼ χγ and that β|α, γ ∼
Normal(b, αγR/c)where b is k-dimensional vector representing prior knowl-
edge on the mean of β, and R is k × k-dimensional matrix that, together
with α and γ, expresses prior knowledge on the variance-covariancematrix
of β. The researcher have to elicit b, α, γ,R. Starting from Zellner (1972) a
number of researches (Kadane et al. (1980),Garthwaite and Dickey (1991)
Oman (1985), amongst the others) have analysed this issue. Here the prob-
lem is to specify the joint distribution for the k coefficients of interest. It is a
quite complicated task and the respondent have to be selected among peo-
ple with a deep knowledge of multiple liner regression. Even if, in the psy-
chological experiments we have seen previously, people are quite good in
recognizing intercepts and slope of a straight lines, here the problem is much
more complicated since we require that people can recognize multiple co-
efficients and their dependency expressed through the variance covariance
matrix. The cited papers are only the most important pieces of research
on this topic, many other papers investigated the possibility to elicit prior for
such a complicated multidimensional hyperparameters, we are not going to
describe these methods. The general critique to them is that this methods
use assessment tasks that people are not very good at performing, the main
problem seems to be the elicitation of the variance-covariance matrix.
5.2 Looking for non-parametric fitting
As we pointed out in the previous section the procedures based on the
elicitation of summaries used to fit a parametric distribution are sensible to
the choice of the priors family, where this choice only reflects the opinion
of the researcher. This in part contradicts the aim of the elicitation process
which should try to embodies as much as possible different opinions on the
same quantity of interest.
The revived interest in elicitation in the bayesian community in the last five
or six years, has led to a few number of nonparametric approaches.
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In Oakley and O’Hagan (2002) the respondents’ opinions about the ran-
dom variable of interest X are supposed to be represented by a probability
density function fX(x). The researcher does not have any knowledge of f
but he or se has a prior distribution over possible f . Since f is a function,
the researcher prior is a distribution over the space of possible values of the
whole function. Then, through some procedure that uses respondents opin-
ions, as usual, a particular f is chosen as prior. Unfortunately to make the
problem tractable, Oakley and O’Hagan (2002) have to restrict the possible
shapes of f letting it to belong to some wide class of probability density
functions. Here we do not want to discuss the method in details. Even if the
method is supposed to be non parametric, it is not fully non parametric since
a sensible restriction have to be made to identify f . On the other hand this
methods has the advantage that not a particular family of priors is chosen
by the researcher as starting point, rather, the researcher focus on a wider
class of distribution functions.
5.3 Evaluation of elicited opinions
Statisticians are aware of the many difficulties of elicitation and after an
elicitation process is completed we ask ourself how we can assess whether
the elicited distribution is an adequate representation of the respondents
knowledge. Before to continue we want to make clear that the way in which
econometricians look to the evaluation step is different to that used by sta-
tisticians. For this reason we will describe their approaches separately. The
problem is that economists think that peoples’ mind obeys to some idea of
rationality theoretically formalized so that peoples behaviour in forming be-
liefs about uncertain quantities can be submitted to a judgement that will
classify believes in “rational” and “non-rational”. We will discuss this issue
in more detail at the end of the next section. Usually statisticians or ex-
perimental psychologists ask themselves wether a given elicited opinion is
coherent in some specified sense.
The starting point is that we are not interested to classify opinions on
uncertain quantities as correct or wrong, we only want to verify that respon-
dents gave us their true opinion. Statisticians use to refer to a concept
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of coherence called “internal consistency”. They argued that a system of
probability statements is coherent if the probabilities are all consistent with
the laws of probability. One way to check the quality of a statements is to
ask for sets of probability assessments that allow tests of coherence, for
instance propose an experiment with two mutually exclusive events X,Y ,
ask for Prob {X} , Prob {Y } and Prob {XorY }, a statement will be inter-
nally consistent if Prob {XorY } = Prob {X} + Prob {Y }. This is a trivial
example, but it can give an idea of what is meant for internal consistency.
In more complicated real elicitation procedures is not so easy to design a
mechanism to verify internal coherence, nice examples of checking for in-
ternal consistency can be found in Lindley et al. (1979).
It is worth to mention that in many of this studies reported opinions are
evaluated via scores methods. The researcher sets a score methods that
give high points to probabilistic statements that fully reflect personal uncer-
tainty. Rather than being an evaluation methods, the main goal of scoring
rules is to induce people to fully state their knowledge, in some sense these
methods can be seen as incentives mechanisms.
6 Elicitation in econometrics
6.1 Elicitation techniques
As we pointed out before, not very much work on elicitation has been
done in econometrics. Before to continue in discussing some of the main
findings, we want to stress the differences between the econometrics ap-
proach to elicitation, and the general statistical approach.
Although in the past few years there is a renewed interest in elicitation
among statisticians, this literature started many years ago. Garthwaite et al.
(2004) contains a general review of the most important findings, in this re-
view the central problem is that of eliciting distributions of priors to solve
problems of prior specifications or prior selections. Here the issue that we
want address is quite different: we want to elicit the uncertainty about a
future quantity summarized by subjective probabilities, so the task we are
requiring to survey respondents is not only to assign a probability over un-
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certain quantities, but we are also requiring to make a prediction. In this
sense, as stated before, our work somehow touches to distinct task: proba-
bilistic judgement and forecasting. In a nutshell, this is the main difference
between the kind of problems analysed in the statistical literature about elic-
itation (see Garthwaite et al., 2004), and the kind of problems we want to
analyse in this work.
While statisticians focused on techniques for elicitation, econometrician
have not done so much work in this direction. The most part of the actual
relevant econometric literature have important qualitative conclusions, how-
ever there not tremendous innovative works addressing the issue of how to
do elicitation. Manski (2004) contains a broad review of the findings where
the economic implications are discussed. Survey responses to questions
about expectation on future events have been employed to study a number
of interesting economic phenomena, we will see some of them.
Domintz and Manski (1997) analyzed perception of job insecurity using
data from the SEE. SEE stands for “Survey of Economic Expectations”, it is
a survey designed by Jeff Domintz and Charles F. Manski and administered
as a module in WISCON, a continuous national random-digit telephone sur-
vey conducted by the University of Wisconsin Survey Center. In the SEE
people are asked about a number of future events and are required to for-
mulate probabilistic statement. Here we report questions asked about the
job insecurity (See the SEE Code Book, pag. 4–5)13:
Code RV451 – JOB LOSS: “I would like you to think about your em-
ployment prospects over the next 12 months. What do you think is
the PERCENT CHANCE that you will lose your job during the next 12
months?”
Code RV452 – FIND AS GOOD A JOB: “If you were to lose your
job during the next 12 months... What do you think is the PERCENT
CHANCE (or CHANCES OUT OF 100) that the job you eventually find
and accept would be at least as good as your current job, in terms of
wages and benefits?”
13An introduction to SEE with codebook and data can be downloaded from
http://www.faculty.econ.northwestern.edu/faculty/manski/
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Code RV453 – leave job voluntarily (All waves): “What do you think is
the PERCENT CHANCE that you will leave your job voluntarily during
the next 12 months?”
Each respondent currently looking for work was asked to provide a
sequence of points on her or his subjective cumulative distribution
function (CDF) of beliefs about the time to find a job. Respondent i
was asked about three thresholds FLm1i, FLm2i, FLm3i, posed
in an increasing order. The questions were as follows:
Code RV455 – DISTRIBUTION FOR TIME TO FIND JOB: “What is
the PERCENT CHANCE (or what are the chances out of 100) that it
will take you less than [FLm] to find a job that you will accept?”
Domintz and Manski (1997) found some interesting results, for example they
found that subjective probability of job loss decreases with the level of edu-
cation. Rather than summarizing results we want to underline that this study
showed that people are willing to answer to question in probabilistic form.
An important contribution was made by Dominitz and Manski (1997),
where they analysed household income expectations. This research is mostly
related with the example of consumption theory we gave before. The data
used by Dominitz and Manski (1997) were taken from SEE. Questions were
asked by the telephone, points on the cumulative distribution function (CDF)
were elicited starting with some warming-up preliminary training session.
Respondents were first asked to report the lowest and highest levels of in-
come that they think possible in the year ahead. The responses to these
preliminary questions were used to set thresholds for a series of four prob-
abilistic questions. Here we report from SEE code book (pag. 5):
Respondent iwas asked about four thresholds –RV FL2i,RV FL3i,
RV FL4i, and RV FL5i – posed in increasing order. Again, the only
exception occurred if a response of 100% chance was given when
one of the thresholds is posed as a coherent subjective distribution
must give 100% chance to all subsequent thresholds. The questions
were as follows:
Code RV460-RV468 — DISTRIBUTION OF FUTURE INCOME, BE-
FORE TAXES: “What do you think is the PERCENT CHANCE (or
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CHANCES OUT OF 100) that your OWN total income, BEFORE
TAXES, will be under $[fill RVFL],000?”
The thresholds about which a respondent was queried were deter-
mined by the respondents answer to a pair of preliminary questions
asking for the lowest and highest possible incomes...
In order to see how thresholds were set see the CEE code book, it is
a quite long procedure, here we skip details. In this report for each re-
spondent i, Fi,k = Prob [y < Yi,k] , k = 1, 2, 3, 4 are observed, where
{Yi,1, Yi,2, Yi,3, Yi,4} are the income thresholds about which respondent i
is queried. To identify the distribution F , authors assumed that F belongs
to the log-normal family. Let F (Y ;M,Q) be log-normal distribution with
median M and interquartile range Q. Let M∗i , Q∗i such that they solve the
least square problem
inf
Mi,Qi
4∑
k=1
[Fi,k − F (Yi,k;M,Q)]2 ,
then M∗i , Q∗i are used to estimate respondents’ i subjective median and
interquartile range and a log-normal distribution is fitted. The authors found
that Q tends to rise with M more than proportionally and that Q exhibits
significant cross-sectional variations. This would contradict the rational ex-
pectations hypothesis. Although Dominitz and Manski (1997) introduce a
quite innovative technique to elicit expectations for continuous variable, we
think that this approach is not fully satisfying since a restrictive assumption
on the class of probability distributions for the expected income is made and
this hypothesis is not testable at all.
Evidence of heterogeneity of expectations have also been confirmed by
Domintz and Manski (2003, 2004). The authors used data from SEE to
study expectations about returns on mutual-fund investments.
Subjective income and inflation expectations data have been used by
Jappelli and Pistaferri (2000) to test, amongst other things, for excess sen-
sitivity of consumption. They used data from 1989–1993 rotating panel of
the Bank of Italy Survey of Household Income and Wealth (SHIW). The
panel offers unique measures of subjective income and inflation expecta-
tions. They found that consumption growth is positively correlated with the
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expected variance of income and uncorrelated with predicted income growth
and this is a result which supports the “precautionary saving model”, in fact
this model predicts that people saving depends on the perceived future risk.
Dominitz (2001) considers the use of expectations and realizations data
to estimate income expectations conditional on observed attributes. In this
work income expectations data and realizations data are used to model ex-
pectations. The data used are taken from the Panel Study of Income Dy-
namics.
An interesting work on expected inflation formation is Mehra (2002)14.
He considers three survey measures of inflation expectations: the Livingston
Survey of Economists (LSE) in which respondents are selected amongst
academic economists; the Michigan Survey of U.S. households (MSH) in
which respondents are households without any particular specialization; and
the Survey of Professional Forecasters (SPF) in which respondents are se-
lected amongst professional economists and analysts. In this work a na¨ive
forecast has been considered as a benchmark, which is simply the most
recent one-year growth rate of consumer price index (CPI) known to the
survey respondents at the time forecasts are made.
The first result is that all survey measures of expectations are nearer the
realized data than those produced by the na¨ive predictive rule. While both
the LSE and MSH forecasts perform equally over the full period and the pe-
riod of rising inflation, the MSH forecasts present the largest mean-deviation
from actual data over a period of downward-trending inflation. This later re-
sult reverses if we consider median-deviations.
Also a Granger-causality tests have been made, and the result is that survey
forecasts contain a forward-looking component and can help in predicting
actual future inflation, this does not apply to the exceptions of LSE.
Another finding is that forecast errors are correlated with past information,
this would contradict the main “axiom” of rational expectation theory which
states the people do not make systematic forecast errors.
In this paper also it is interesting that data on expectations collected — on
different individuals with different backgrounds knowledge — exhibit some
14Here the approach employed is very similar to that of Thomas (1999).
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pattern in the deviation of expectations form actual data, and that mean-
deviations and median-deviations present significant cross-sectional and
longitudinal variations.
Also it is interesting to notice that expectations of respondents in MSH —
i.e. household with no particular required knowledge of economics or sta-
tistics — fully reflect the path of realized inflation rate in median but they
are “biased” in mean during periods of structural changes in the process of
prices’ growth. This result seems to confirm what has been found in the
experimental psychological literature (see Peterson and Miller, 1964).
In this section we reviewed some of the relevant existing literature in
econometrics where subjective expectations are used. In this review we
have certainly noticed that, although subjective data are used, there has
not been a development of tools to recover subjective distributions over un-
certainty quantities of interest. The only exception is Dominitz and Manski
(1997), but has we already pointed out in this paper a restrictive assumption
on the family of distribution to which the expected income belongs is made.
Dominitz and Manski (1997) is an important contribution, but more sophisti-
cated techniques are needed.
6.2 Evaluating elicited expectations
Once we have elicited expectations or other forms of probabilistic judge-
ments we need to assess the quality of our analysis. Often we read word-
ing like “accuracy of expectations”, “bias of expectations”, “correctness of
expectations”, and other expressions like these. In our view this is an im-
proper wording if we refer to expectations that peoples hold in their mind.
Suppose I observe the price for apples today, say it is 1 euros per kilogram,
suppose one ask to me “what price do you expect for apples tomorrow?”,
and suppose my answer is 1.1 Euros per kilogram. Now, suppose that the
next day we go on the fruit market and the price of apples is 1.15 Euros. An
economist would say that I made a “mistake” which can be measured by the
forecast error, which is -5 cents of euro, he would also argue that by ratio-
nal expectation hypothesis, if we repeat this experiment an huge number of
time, this error should be equal to 0 on average.
39
Why are we talking about an error? There are several reasons why
we should not talk about errors, we give for instance an extreme one. Sup-
pose we are willing to make the extremely unrealistic assumption that a data
generating process of prices can be identified, and that I have a proper sub-
jective probability distribution over this data generating process. It could be
that from the time I made my statement about expected prices to the time in
which the new price is formed in the next period, something in the informa-
tion set, on which I conditioned my stated expectation, has changed. This
is almost always the case in economics. We measure economics variables
at discrete time interval and we make probabilistic judgements on informa-
tion acquired at discrete time intervals, but economic phenomena occurs in
continuous time, so that the information we would like to observe changes
continuously over time.
In this sense even in a world of extremely smart people who are able to re-
cover the data generating process of apples’ price, if prices are measured at
discrete time intervals, and if their expectation stated at time t about apples’
price at time t+1 is different from the true apple price we pay at time t+1,
we cannot say that a forecast error has been made. To say that a forecast
error has been made, we should be sure that nothing has changed in the
available information between the time when we stated our expectation and
the time when the new price is available. We should agree that such an
assumption would be unrealistic and impossible to assess.
So we do not agree with the wording which is common amongst econo-
mists. We believe that at most we could talk about “coherence” of proba-
bilistic judgements. The concept of coherence that here is inspired to De
Finetti. As we pointed out before, we do not believe in that “it is important
what people do, not what people think”, instead we believe that it is impor-
tant to assess whether what people think is coherent with what they do. If
what people do is coherent with the probabilistic judgement they made, we
can use this judgement to predict future behaviours. Suppose we have an
urn containing blue and red balls, we know the proportion of the two kind of
balls, suppose we attach a lottery to the urn, that is, if a red ball is drawn
then nothing is payed, if a blue ball is drawn 5 euros are payed. There are
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many players, we can decide if we want to participate to the lottery or not, if
we decide to participate then we pay 2 Euros we draw the ball and we get 5
Euros if the result is a blu ball, otherwise we can pass to the next player and
will never partecipate to the game. Suppose that it is my turn, suppose that
before I state whether I want play or pass, someone ask to me which is the
probability that I would attach to the event that a blu ball is extracted in the
next drawn. Suppose I say “2%” and next I am asked if I want to play or not,
and I say that I want to play. In this case I would say that I am not coherent
because my probabilistic statement implies that I expect to lose roughly 2
Euros and still I want to play the game. When we talk about coherence this
is what we mean.
Now we will review some of the econometric analysis that has been
made about the evaluation of elicited probabilistic judgement. Again, we will
try to avoid confusing words as much as we can.
One thing that econometricians do is to simply compare individual ex-
pectations with realizations data. Dominitz (1998) used a one year follow-up
to a preliminary 1993 version of SEE to evaluate the accuracy of respon-
dents expectations about weekly earnings. He assumed that people hold a
subjective distribution for earnings which is continuous and that realizations
are cross-sectionally independent. He estimated the empirical distribution
of expectations and the empirical distribution of realized data, and then he
measured the distance between the two distribution by comparing quan-
tiles. Applying this criterion, he found that expectations and realizations did
not match entirely. Dominitz (1998) found that expectations were “too opti-
mistic” (said the author), in the sense that central tendency of expectations
exceeds central tendency of realizations, and “too confident”, i.e., spread of
realizations exceeds spread perceived by respondents.
We should notice that this kind comparisons need panel data, in fact we
need to estimate the empirical distribution of expectations at each period
(cross-section estimate), and then we need to compare — following some
statistical criterion — this distribution with the estimated empirical distribu-
tion of realized data in the next period (longitudinal comparison).
Furthermore, the idea behind this procedure is that we should find in the
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data what peoples expect, the problem of this philosophy is that realized
data can be determined by other factors that are not under the control of
respondents, so that realized data will not reflect peoples’ action based on
their expectations.
Another procedure used in literature has been the comparison of mean
expectations and mean realizations. Domintz and Manski (1997) used this
approach to evaluate the one-year-ahead expectations from SEE in 1994,
they compared expectations with the realizations reported by the new sam-
ple of respondents interviewed in 1995, simply comparing means of expec-
tations and realizations. All SEE respondents were asked to elicit expec-
tations of health insurance coverage, crime victimization, and the job-loss
questions (see SEE codbook pag. 3-5), the comparison showed that mean
expectations and realizations of health insurance match up closely.
The last procedure we explore is the comparison of mean expectations
with historical realizations. This methods assume that successive cohorts
of persons have the same distribution of realizations for a given variable of
interest. Under this assumption the previous method of comparing mean of
expectations and realized data, it is applied comparing expectations and re-
alized data of different cohorts. This is needed when the researcher wants
to apply the method described before, but she or he does not have mea-
sured data on realizations for each period for each individual. Fischhoff
et al. (2000) conducted a study on a numbers of life events eliciting expec-
tations in different cohorts, then they compared mean of expectations with
historical realized data on different cohorts. They concluded that the result
of comparison largely depends on the expectations of teens, over the years
the distribution of teens’ expectations change sensibly and comparison with
historical realized data on different cohorts is misleading.
Our opinion is that comparison is that when we compare expectations
data with realizations, we should be careful in our conclusion. For the kind of
variables involved in the cited studies, even if peoples’ actions are coherent
with their expectations, realized data not only depend on peoples’ action but
they also depend on a number of factors out of peoples’ control. Suppose
42
we collected data on expected future earnings and then we want to compare
expected earnings with realized earnings. Suppose that after we measured
expectations, and before we measure realized earnings, a new unexpected
law has passed which changes the discipline of labor contracts. Suppose we
compare expectations with realized data, then —using the wording popular
among economists— could we conclude that peoples’ do not have “accu-
rate expectations”? We think that we cannot conclude that peoples’ have
“inaccurate expectations”, simply we cannot make any comparison.
Another comment is that comparison based on summary of distribu-
tions, and especially the mean, is not reasonable. First of all a distribution is
not only characterized by central tendency, and moreover we have already
seen that from experimental psychological literature it results that probabilis-
tic judgement is biased in mean.
7 Conclusions
In this short chapter we tried to give an overview of the problem of
eliciting probability distributions. The starting point has been the need of
less unrealistic modelling in econometrics as pointed out in Manski (2004)
(amongst the others). In fact, in econometrics very often modelling con-
siders unobservable expectations amongst independent variable. Trying to
estimate this models implies that to achieve fully identification of the joint
probability of the response, econometricians have to make unclear and un-
realistic assumptions. In the last few years there has been an increasing
interest by econometrician in eliciting probability distribution in order to esti-
mate expectations. We also described researches on elicitation in psychol-
ogy and bayesian statistic where these kind of works started many years
ago.
Although there has been a tremendous effort by econometricians in this
direction of the research, we think that the methods employed are not fully
satisfying. Econometricians still think that people have in mind some model
which correspond to a probability distribution on uncertain outcomes. Our
43
approach will be more unpretentious than this, in fact, we think that an indi-
vidual could be even not able to assign a probability distribution on uncer-
tainty outcomes; and even in this case we will not say that those individuals
are “not rational”. Assigning probability to uncertain outcomes can be very
hard even in experiment involving two or three outcomes. On these basis,
we believe any elicitated probability distribution is false, in the sense that it
cannot represent to true uncertainty which people have in mind. Our effort
will be devoted to set up reasonable methodology and statistical tools in or-
der to represent this uncertainty as close as possible to that perceived by
peoples. We see the need of bayesian methods in this field because of the
necessity to fully express the starting uncertainty via priors probability and
then to revise this uncertainty trough posteriors.
In our future work our basis will be the evidence collected up this mo-
ment. Evidence suggests that people are better to express their opinions in
terms of quantiles and other summaries, rather than to perform judgements
in terms of probabilities. The experimental psychological literature showed
that people are not able to perform probabilistic judgement when the sit-
uation becomes complex and the number of variables increases. For this
reason we do not think that multivariate elicitation is achievable, so that we
will try to develop methods that reduce multivariate elicitation to univariate
where possible.
At this stage we do not have a clear idea of what we are going to do.
What is clear is the object of our research. We will try to set up a method
of elicitation in which expectations of a random quantity X will be computed
taking the expectation of the predictive distribution overX where this predic-
tive distribution will be computed starting from an elicitated prior and then
getting the posterior given realized data on X and data on expectations
about X . We think that with this framework we will add knowledge to what
have been done. We can express peoples’ uncertainty on X trough their
elicited prior, the revision process through the posterior will give us knowl-
edge on the updating process of information, also we will combine past data
with new data on expectations and we will take into account peoples’ het-
erogeneity allowing prior uncertainty to vary among them.
As we said so far this is a rough draft. Before to apply any methods
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to real data we need to follow a number of steps. We need to elaborate
appropiate methods of priors elicitation suited for our problem, eventually we
need to test this method trough an experimental session. Then we want to
develop the statistical tools needed, and finally we will apply this techniques
to some real world datasets.
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